The goal of the efficiency gap is to determine the magnitude of what Stephanopoulos and McGhee call \u201cwasted\u201d votes. \u00a0These are either (a) votes cast for a losing candidate, or (b) surplus votes cast for a winning candidate. \u00a0In order to change one\u2019s vote from meaningful to \u201cwasted,\u201d politicians have used methods of dividing and conquering that are simply ingenious (see: \u201cpacking\u201d and \u201ccracking\u201d strategies<\/a>). \u00a0They craft bizarrely-shaped districts that cut through communities and connect disparate interests in order to most effectively dilute the power of the opposition party. \u00a0The result is that one party can capture a strong majority in the legislature even while the other wins the statewide popular vote, as Michigan Democrats learned in 2014.<\/p>\n Calculating the efficiency gap is remarkably simple: divide the net number of \u201cwasted\u201d votes by the total number of votes cast. \u00a0The result is intended to indicate the level of disparity between the will of the people and the will of the politicians that devised the electoral map. \u00a0In the 2016 Michigan races for the state house, the efficiency gap was 10.3 percent\u2014the third straight house election that resulted in a double-digit gap in favor of Republicans, according<\/a> to the Associated Press. \u00a0Few states have it worse.<\/p>\n Despite Stephanopoulos and McGhee\u2019s research, the question remains: does the efficiency gap tell us anything about whether partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional<\/i>?<\/p>\n This metric of redistricting is at the center of a potentially monumental decision before the Supreme Court, Gill v. Whitford<\/i>. \u00a0The case revolves around the state of Wisconsin, where its efficiency gap has never been recorded<\/a> higher than in recent elections for the legislature. \u00a0After Republicans won control over both the state senate and assembly in 2010, they proposed a redistricting plan that attempted to enfeeble Democratic voting power and enlarge GOP control over the next ten years. \u00a0But in 2016, a federal district court ruled the plan an unconstitutional gerrymander, citing the efficiency gap as its yardstick. \u00a0The Supreme Court is now considering a handful of issues, including whether the efficiency gap is a viable standard for striking down statewide redistricting plans and whether claims of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable.<\/p>\n But even if the Supreme Court is able to find a workable standard for throwing out unfair maps, it is highly unlikely that it will address the root of the problem: the district-drawing process itself. Thirty-seven states share Wisconsin\u2019s model, which gives reapportionment power to the majority party in the state legislature. \u00a0The Supreme Court will not alter this; extensive change must come from the states themselves.<\/p>\n For this we must return to Michigan, where a grassroots organization thinks they have a solution. The group\u2019s name is Voters Not Politicians (VNP), and its mission is simple: turn Michigan\u2019s redistricting system on its head.<\/p>\n VNP\u2019s proposal<\/a> is a radical one. \u00a0Its goal is to completely replace Michigan\u2019s reapportionment procedure through a statewide referendum that would amend the state constitution. \u00a0Should Michigan voters approve the ballot initiative, VNP\u2019s plan would transfer all redistricting powers[note]This includes the power to draw state house, state senate, and U.S. congressional district lines.[\/note] currently vested in the legislature to a thirteen-person citizen commission. \u00a0A small group of Michigan voters would control the process, preventing lawmakers from reinforcing partisan advantages and restoring a level of integrity to Michigan\u2019s electoral system. \u00a0As of late November, the petition has gathered<\/a> over 350,000 signatures.<\/p>\n How are the commissioners chosen? \u00a0The proposal goes to great lengths to open the selection process to a wide spread of the population and to separate it from the political fray. \u00a0Any registered voter can apply, and the Secretary of State randomly mails an additional ten thousand applications to ensure a substantial pool of candidates. \u00a0The only restrictions on eligibility bar the following from serving: elected officials, registered lobbyists, leadership of political parties, consultants for political action committees, and family members of the aforementioned categories. \u00a0And, in an attempt to bring low-income residents into the process, commissioners will receive a minimum compensation of around $40,000.[note]Commissioners receive a salary at least equal to twenty-five percent of the governor\u2019s salary, which currently stands at just under $160,000 according<\/a> to the State Officers Compensation Commission.[\/note]<\/p>\n The Secretary of State will then randomly select a group of two hundred people\u2014one hundred from the open application, one hundred from the randomly selected applications\u2014using a statistical model that, according to VNP\u2019s website<\/a>, \u201cmirrors the geographic and demographic makeup of the state as closely as possible.\u201d \u00a0From this final pool, a thirteen-person commission made up of four Democrats, four Republicans, and five non-affiliated (or third-party) voters will be randomly selected.<\/p>\n In California, the only state with an active citizen redistricting commission, chance does not play nearly as large of a role in the selection process<\/a>. \u00a0After the initial application phase, a three-member Applicant Review Panel from the state auditor\u2019s office selects 120 of the most \u201cqualified\u201d candidates for the next round. \u00a0The panel then conducts interviews with these applicants and selects sixty of the most \u201cqualified\u201d (by the panel\u2019s standard) from that pool. \u00a0In the Michigan proposal, this level of screening does not exist. \u00a0The thirteen members need not have any experience in politics to serve on the commission.<\/p>\n Then comes the difficult part: drawing the districts. \u00a0A powerful objection to the VNP plan is that it merely exports the problems of gerrymandering to a smaller body; it sidesteps the party politics inherent to redistricting. \u00a0The question is: how will the proposal prevent the citizen commission from devolving into the same old partisan power struggles?<\/p>\n VNP has answers. \u00a0First, the commission is required to comply with a list<\/a> of rules that are ranked in order of priority. \u00a0If two rules ever come into conflict when creating a map, commissioners must side with the higher-ranked rule. \u00a0They are as follows:<\/p>\n These guidelines eliminate the possibility of hyper-partisan gerrymandering. \u00a0They identify and prohibit many of the strategies legislators have used in the past, thereby preventing the commission from arriving at the same politicized results. \u00a0Although this curtails the power of each commissioner, the system prohibits those maps which are the most egregious in their partisanship. \u00a0The rules limit the range of plans that the commission can produce, but they also aim at something close to fairness.<\/p>\n Second, the approval process for each map ensures that the commission reaches decisions in a bipartisan (perhaps even non-partisan) fashion. \u00a0While it only takes a simple majority to approve each map, that majority must contain at least two Democrats, two Republicans, and two of the non-affiliated\/third-party commissioners.[note]If the commission cannot reach this bipartisan majority, it adopts a plan through a form of ranked-choice voting.[\/note]\u00a0 This model forces members of the commission to work across party lines and achieve consensus. \u00a0\u00a0As it stands today, the system in Michigan allows the majority party exclusive control over redistricting. \u00a0That party can ignore all opposition and devise a map that will suit its political needs for the next decade\u2014all with just a one-member majority in each chamber of the legislature at the time of reapportionment.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the proposal includes various measures that keep the commission\u2019s activity transparent and accountable to the public. \u00a0All commission business must take place in open meetings, and all data must enter the public record. \u00a0This provision prevents the secrecy that plagued Wisconsin, in which GOP lawmakers held secret meetings to determine which map would maximize their advantage. \u00a0A federal district court criticized<\/a> \u00a0the Republicans for \u201cflailing wildly in a desperate attempt to hide from both the Court and the public the true nature of exactly what transpired in the redistricting process.\u201d \u00a0Such flailing would be impossible under the Michigan proposal, as the commission is required to hold at least five public hearings for each proposed plan.<\/p>\n Finally, after adopting a proposal, the commission must publish a report that explains its reasoning. \u00a0The report must detail the commission\u2019s decision-making process, which the state supreme court then confirms is pursuant to the rules for drawing the maps. \u00a0Sixty days later, the plan becomes law.<\/p>\n What are we to make of this proposal? \u00a0Is this a viable alternative to the status quo, or merely a pipe dream? \u00a0Does a random group of people better represent our interests than elected legislators? \u00a0Wrapped into the idea of a citizen redistricting commission are political riddles that have their origins long before our time. \u00a0Before we can answer these questions, we must examine two facets of representative democracy in America that deserve our attention.<\/p>\n At a time when many Americans are dissatisfied with our country\u2019s political institutions, \u00a0<\/b>the VNP proposal embraces that distrust. \u00a0We\u2019ve all heard it. \u00a0Rhetoric that targets the country\u2019s elite\u2014see: the so-called \u201cWashington insiders,\u201d \u201cestablishment hacks,\u201d and \u201cDeep State\u201d\u2014is to be found on both the left and the right, and has resulted in remarkable electoral success. \u00a0Without a doubt, VNP rides this wave. \u00a0Throughout its messaging, the group uses the term \u201cpolitician\u201d as pejorative. \u00a0The prohibition on elected officials and their families from serving as commissioners draws a strict divide between \u201cthe people of Michigan\u201d and state lawmakers. \u00a0VNP\u2019s website repeatedly hammers home a single message: your representatives have failed you<\/i>.<\/p>\n But in another sense, the proposal in Michigan reflects not just trust, but radical trust\u2014in one\u2019s fellow citizens. \u00a0In the United States, it is rare to see an experiment that gives common people\u2014selected almost entirely by chance\u2014such power to deliberate and make substantive decisions. The idea of a citizen commission, though limited to a handful of people, provides a model of democracy alien to the political culture of today.<\/p>\n We have been content to accept the notion that the most important political decisions will be made for us. \u00a0By apathy or mere convenience, we have circumscribed civic life to casting our ballots every two or four years and the occasional jury duty. \u00a0\u201cI Voted\u201d stickers displayed in clear view, we walk away from our local polling place feeling proud to be Americans while, the very next day, our representatives resume control over the ship of state. \u00a0Our duty is done. \u00a0Life goes on.<\/p>\n The citizen commission tests this assumption. \u00a0It reframes the possibilities of citizenship as participatory rather than passive\u2014a politics in which we are not merely ruled but rule ourselves. \u00a0To be sure, it demands more of us. \u00a0But it gives us a real hand in the governance of our communities and invests us in the lives of our neighbours. \u00a0Perhaps most importantly, it stands as a safeguard against the potential abuses of our representative democracy.<\/p>\n VNP recognizes this, and rejects the notion that \u201cexpertise\u201d or \u201cpolitical experience\u201d is a prerequisite to fair redistricting; it may even be the greatest hindrance. \u00a0In this case, the citizen\u2019s wisdom comes precisely from her lack<\/i> of commitments to which every politician is beholden. \u00a0Party loyalty and the quest for reelection are not the concern of the everyday Michigander. \u00a0While she may hold a set of political beliefs and prefer, say, the Republican platform, party strong-arming just isn\u2019t possible within the commission\u2019s model of consensus. \u00a0Even the most partisan members must work together.<\/p>\n Therefore, what may initially appear as a reckless attempt to redistribute the duties of elected officials to random people actually serves as a legitimate popular check on the legislature. \u00a0As it stands today, the public exerts its power on the political system through the vote; this is its only recourse for enacting change. \u00a0But when lawmakers gerrymander districts, they are able to cripple the voting power of its opponents to the point that such recourse is impossible. \u00a0In the landmark Supreme Court case Baker v. Carr<\/i> (1962), the Court identified precisely the situation in which many Americans find themselves today:<\/p>\n The majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket… This is because the legislative policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment of any kind is prevented. The people have been rebuffed at the hands of the Assembly… We therefore must conclude that the people of Tennessee are stymied and without judicial intervention will be saddled with the present discrimination in the affairs of their state government.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Then and today, the only way to fix such a problem is through extra-legislative means. \u00a0For the voters of Tennessee, it required the nation\u2019s highest court to make a controversial dive into what Justice Felix Frankfurter called \u201cthe political thicket.\u201d \u00a0For the voters of Michigan, relief may come only through a constitutional amendment approved by popular referendum. \u00a0One part of the debate is certain: when state legislators repeatedly use redistricting power to game the electoral system, appeals to their expertise ring hollow.<\/p>\n One fascinating aspect of the VNP proposal\u2014and the redistricting conundrum generally\u2014is its reliance on the idea of a \u201ccommunity of interest.\u201d \u00a0It defines them as \u201cpopulations that share cultural or historical characteristics, or economic interests.\u201d \u00a0Commissioners must answer this: what constitutes a group worth reflecting in the state or national legislature? \u00a0This is it; this is the<\/i> question of representation. \u00a0To solve the problem of gerrymandering, then, is to answer the question of what community means in America.<\/p>\n Needless to say, this question \u00a0is immensely complicated. \u00a0The term is expansive and vague, with few obvious routes to identifying which interests are worth representing.[note]There are attempts out there to develop a methodology for drawing districts based on the community of interest model. \u00a0Such attempts are not addressed in this article, but those interested should read this paper<\/a> from Professor Todd Makse of Florida International University.[\/note]\u00a0 Because of this, the community of interest approach to reapportionment\u2014although it may be the most just\u2014 often stands in opposition to other, more easily quantifiable models of what constitutes a fair district. \u00a0For instance, there are plenty of cases in which a community of interest may come into direct conflict with drawing districts that are competitive (a basic defense against partisan \u201cpacking\u201d). \u00a0Take the case of a school district, potentially a valid community of interest, that may overwhelmingly support one political party. \u00a0Or suppose we determine, as some<\/a> have, that a district with a more compact shape is more reasonable than those of bizarre geometry, such as Maryland\u2019s third and Texas\u2019 thirty-fifth (above). \u00a0This, too, is insufficient. \u00a0In the case of Illinois\u2019 fourth, a congressional district that resembles<\/a> a pair of earmuffs, actually connects a pair of Hispanic communities to give them representation in Congress. \u00a0Weird shapes don\u2019t necessarily mean unfair districts; they can give minority groups a voice. \u00a0The list goes on.<\/p>\n With the recent swing toward using the efficiency gap as the<\/i> calculus in the gerrymandering debate, the community question has taken a backseat. \u00a0To be sure, the two approaches serve different ends. \u00a0While the former aims to strike down entire state maps, the latter is a modest attempt at drawing individual districts fairly. \u00a0Nonetheless, it is clear that the efficiency gap misses something. \u00a0The metric only identifies a discrepancy between statewide<\/i> vote totals and which party wins the seats. \u00a0Nowhere in this analysis is there a recognition that the purpose of representation in a state house is to give local interests a voice in the legislature. \u00a0It is true that the efficiency gap aims only to rule out the most extreme maps (Stephanopoulos and McGhee allow an eight percent gap before a state map is considered unfair). \u00a0But if groups like Michigan\u2019s citizen commission are to reform the system from the ground up, we must remember that proper representation is not merely a reflection of the majority\u2019s will. \u00a0This begins with defining community, a job that may require sociologists and ethnographers as much as it requires political scientists.<\/p>\n Perhaps it is unfair to view this proposal or any of its like as a catch-all solution. \u00a0Instead, it may be wise to treat the citizen commission not as an answer to the redistricting puzzle, but as a reform that asks a series of questions. \u00a0Does this model embrace distrust of our institutions or instill trust in new ones? \u00a0Are we afraid of a democracy in which ordinary people are forced to make complex decisions? \u00a0Who do we believe is fit to control our political system? \u00a0Is this thing worth a shot?<\/p>\n Next November, the people of Michigan will decide.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On November 8, 2016, Michigan voters lined up to cast their ballots. \u00a0They lined up from Detroit to Kalamazoo and from Marquette to Adrian\u2014the last chapter in a spectacle of a presidential campaign that had seized the nation\u2019s attention. \u00a0Some watched in horror as the numbers started to come in, others with cautious optimism. \u00a0When […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":594,"featured_media":2514,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[158],"class_list":["post-2485","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-gerrymandering","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2485","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/594"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2485"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2485\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2514"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2485"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2485"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2485"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Boundaries](\"http:\/\/bowdoinglobalist.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/Maryland_US_Congressional_District_3_since_2013-1.tif-1024x492.jpg\")
![\"Boundaries](\"http:\/\/bowdoinglobalist.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/Texas_US_Congressional_District_35_since_2013-1024x466.jpg\")
The Proposal in Michigan<\/h4>\n
\n
The “Problem” of Expertise<\/h4>\n
The Community Question<\/h4>\n
![resembles<\/a> a pair of earmuffs, actually connects a pair of Hispanic communities to give them representation in Congress. \u00a0Weird shapes don\u2019t necessarily mean unfair districts; they can give minority groups a voice. \u00a0The list goes on.<\/p>\nWith the recent swing toward using the efficiency gap as the<\/i> calculus in the gerrymandering debate, the community question has taken a backseat. \u00a0To be sure, the two approaches serve different ends. \u00a0While the former aims to strike down entire state maps, the latter is a modest attempt at drawing individual districts fairly. \u00a0Nonetheless, it is clear that the efficiency gap misses something. \u00a0The metric only identifies a discrepancy between statewide<\/i> vote totals and which party wins the seats. \u00a0Nowhere in this analysis is there a recognition that the purpose of representation in a state house is to give local interests a voice in the legislature. \u00a0It is true that the efficiency gap aims only to rule out the most extreme maps (Stephanopoulos and McGhee allow an eight percent gap before a state map is considered unfair). \u00a0But if groups like Michigan\u2019s citizen commission are to reform the system from the ground up, we must remember that proper representation is not merely a reflection of the majority\u2019s will. \u00a0This begins with defining community, a job that may require sociologists and ethnographers as much as it requires political scientists.<\/p>\nPerhaps it is unfair to view this proposal or any of its like as a catch-all solution. \u00a0Instead, it may be wise to treat the citizen commission not as an answer to the redistricting puzzle, but as a reform that asks a series of questions. \u00a0Does this model embrace distrust of our institutions or instill trust in new ones? \u00a0Are we afraid of a democracy in which ordinary people are forced to make complex decisions? \u00a0Who do we believe is fit to control our political system? \u00a0Is this thing worth a shot?<\/p>\nNext November, the people of Michigan will decide.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"On November 8, 2016, Michigan voters lined up to cast their ballots. \u00a0They lined up from Detroit to Kalamazoo and from Marquette to Adrian\u2014the last chapter in a spectacle of a presidential campaign that had seized the nation\u2019s attention. \u00a0Some watched in horror as the numbers started to come in, others with cautious optimism. \u00a0When […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":594,"featured_media":2514,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[158],"class_list":["post-2485","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-gerrymandering","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2485","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/594"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2485"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2485\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2514"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2485"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2485"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/students.bowdoin.edu\/bowdoin-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2485"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}](\"http:\/\/all-that-is-interesting.com\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/06\/fourth-district-of-illinois-map1.jpg\"){kind=link}