• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Home
  • Categories
  • Authors
  • Print Versions
  • About
  • Masthead
    • 2022-2023
    • 2016-2017

The Bowdoin Review

The Peshawar Massacre & The War On Education

Written by: Adam Hunt '17
Published on: May 18, 2015

Photo by Jordi Bernabeau Farrus
Photo by Jordi Bernabeau Farrus

On December 14th of this past year, there was an attack made by the Pakistani Taliban on an English-medium, army-run public school in Peshawar. The school had roughly 1,100 students ranging in age from 8 to 18 and was on the outside, and in many ways functionally, just like any junior-high or high-school complex you would find in suburban America. Many kids who went there had parents in the army, but it was also the school of many non-military families – just a good local school, which although military in name, was not militant in the way someplace like West Point is, for example. The event, truly a massacre, left 132 schoolchildren and 13 teachers and faculty dead. It is being called the largest terrorist attack in Pakistani history and the newest offensive in the “war on education” by prominent media in the US and Pakistan.

The violence began at 10:00 a.m., Peshawar time, when a man strapped with a suicide-vest stormed into an auditorium-style classroom where an exam was being taken and self-detonated. Almost immediately, five other gunmen, also wearing suicide-devices, stormed into the school and began shooting teachers and students indiscriminately. According to survivors, shooting in a given classroom would begin mass-execution style, by which one or a few of the gunmen would spray bullets into the crowd of children, and would then proceed into close range shootings by gunmen pacing around the room, looking for survivors. It is believed that most of the student and faculty deaths took place within the first few minutes of the attack; after the nearly immediate response of security forces, the incident turned into a hostage situation which lasted nearly 8 hours involving 34 students, 20 teachers and the last two remaining gunmen. The gunmen were ultimately shot and killed by the police. None of the hostages were harmed.

The Pakistani Taliban took responsibility for the attack roughly two days later. Pictures of the gunmen taken shortly before the attack were posted online, and a public statement given by Pakistani Taliban spokesman Mohammad Khurasani included both a justification of the event, claiming that the Pakistani Military has long been killing innocent children and families of Taliban members, and a warning, promising further attacks on military institutions and advising civilians to distance themselves from them immediately. “We targeted the army’s school for the attack because the government is targeting our families and females… We want them to feel the pain,” he said.

The Pakistani government responded swiftly to the event, lifting a moratorium on the death penalty for terrorism cases that had been instated in 2008. Obama stood strongly with the Pakistani Government saying, “We… reiterate the commitment of the United States to support the government of Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism and extremism and to promote peace and stability in the region.” This support is likely to come in the form of increased military aid, specifically drone strikes.

The attack comes at, and as, a defining moment for the Pakistani Taliban after years of internal tensions and differences in leadership. It is important to note that unlike other Taliban groups, the Pakistani Taliban is more of a disparate coalescence of forces, often defined by geographical barriers and each with its own leadership, which, although sharing some goals, also differ greatly in their ultimate motives regarding their relationship with the Pakistani Government. In May 2014, the Mehsud faction of the organization, historically considered the basis and most important of the various groups, defected from the TTP in protest of its more violent, extremist practices. “We consider kidnapping for ransom, extortion, damage to public facilities and bombings to be un-Islamic. [TTP] Mehsud group believes in stopping the oppressor from cruelty, and supporting the oppressed,” said Mehsud in a public statement after the split. In August 2014, TTP elements from four of the seven tribal areas defected after disagreeing with the leader of the TTP’s decision to combat the Pakistani Army during Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Along with other shifts, the TTP has also become progressively more internationally diverse in its agency; for example, all of the terrorists of the Peshawar were foreign nationals – one Chechen, three Arabs and two Afghans.

Within the Pakistani Taliban, an increasingly international make-up, radical nature and directed focus against the Pakistani government reflects what the Pakistani government has long claimed to be efforts of Indian and Afghani intelligence agencies to infiltrate and gain control of the Pakistani Taliban for the purpose of waging a proxy war against Pakistan. After the Peshawar shooting, the Pakistani Army’s official spokesperson, Major General Asim Bajwa, claimed, “India is funding Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchistan,” citing that, given the Pakistani Taliban’s disparate structure and banned status, it would be unable to exist with such power and resource without the backing of a country of India’s scale. The Pakistani government has also come out against the state of Afghanistan, particularly strongly after high-status TTP officials were seen being escorted by Afghani Intelligence, picked up by US officials and returned to Pakistani authorities. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has also affirmatively cited the role of Indian and Afghani intelligence in aiding the Pakistani Taliban, saying that India has “for many years been using Afghanistan to fight a proxy war against Pakistan by sponsoring terror attacks inside it… India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border.” On the other hand, the Pakistani government has been doing the same thing against Afghanistan. Ex-President and Army Chief of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, has since leaving office noted Pakistan’s history of supporting the Afghani Taliban. Notably, the Afghani Taliban came out against the attack in Peshawar, referring to the act as “un-islamic”.

So, in essence what exists now is a network of proxy wars – an Indian proxy offensive against Pakistan that has lasted since the Partition of 1947, facilitated by Afghanistan, which to some degree is inescapably caught in the middle and merely choosing the stronger side and to some degree is defending its interests by minimalizing Pakistan’s strength in the region, and a Pakistani proxy war against Afghanistan, supported by the US, which also has its own interests in the Middle East. The politics are such that an aggressive proxy war against India is impractical, both for Pakistan and the United States, although it is almost certainly being waged to some degree.

It’s tough to predict the future of the situation. The Afghani Taliban is fundamentally different than the Pakistani Taliban, and may not be as malleable by an outside agent as the Pakistani Taliban has been by India and Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistan has less economic and political influence than India, likely limiting its capacity to influence terrorist groups in these other countries. However, caught in the middle as it is, Afghanistan does not seem to be in a much safer position. The future of the conflict will likely be seen most vividly, and most messily, in Afghanistan and Pakistan by means of indirect, veiled conflict.

Categories: Asia-PacificTags: Pakistan

Primary Sidebar

Recent Posts

  • Why South Africa Remains Unequal Thirty Years After Apartheid May 7, 2024
  • Skeptical of September February 8, 2024
  • Waterwheel February 7, 2024
  • Nineteen February 7, 2024
  • D.C.’s Most Expensive Retirement Home: Congress    February 7, 2024
  • Instagram

Archives

  • May 2024
  • February 2024
  • October 2023
  • April 2023
  • February 2023
  • December 2022
  • November 2022
  • October 2022
  • September 2022
  • May 2022
  • April 2022
  • February 2022
  • December 2021
  • November 2021
  • April 2021
  • March 2021
  • February 2021
  • December 2020
  • November 2020
  • October 2020
  • September 2020
  • April 2020
  • February 2020
  • January 2020
  • December 2019
  • November 2019
  • October 2019
  • May 2019
  • April 2019
  • March 2019
  • February 2019
  • January 2019
  • December 2018
  • November 2018
  • October 2018
  • August 2018
  • May 2018
  • April 2018
  • March 2018
  • February 2018
  • January 2018
  • December 2017
  • November 2017
  • October 2017
  • September 2017
  • June 2017
  • May 2017
  • April 2017
  • March 2017
  • February 2017
  • December 2016
  • November 2016
  • October 2016
  • May 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • February 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • November 2015
  • May 2015
  • April 2015
  • December 2014
  • October 2014
  • April 2014
  • March 2014
  • December 2013
  • November 2013
  • February 2012

Copyright © 2025 · The Bowdoin Review - A voice on campus for politics, society, and culture.